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The Colombian reform to the health system (Law 100 of 1993) established, as strategy to facilitate the 
access, the universality of a health insurance that is acquired by means of the quotation in the contributive 
regime or by means of the gratuitous affiliation to the subsidized regime, in order to cover all the 
population with a unique plan of benefits that includes services in all levels of complexity. In this paper 
we intend to cover the main streamlined facts of the reform as far as coverage and access of the insurance, 
by means of logit models, the determinants of the enrollment and the access are considered, using data 
from the Living Standards Surveys of 1997 and 2003. It stands out that the coverage rose from 20% of the 
population in 1993 to 60% in 2003, although it seems very difficult to reach the universality; the structure 
and evolution of the coverage show that both regimes complement each other, while the contributive one 
has greater presence in the cities and among the population with formal employment, the subsidized one 
has greater weight among the rural population and in those with low levels of income; on the other hand, 
the insurance has advantages for the subsidized population, with a greater probability for use of the 
services, although the plan offers less benefits than the contributive one there are some barriers for the 
access.  
 





La reforma colombiana al sistema de salud (Ley 100 de 1993) estableció, como estrategia para facilitar el 
acceso, la universalidad de un seguro de salud que se adquiere mediante la cotización en el régimen 
contributivo o mediante la afiliación gratuita al régimen subsidiado, con la meta de cubrir a toda la 
población con un plan de beneficios único que comprende servicios de todos los niveles de atención. En el 
documento se analizan los principales hechos estilizados de la reforma en cuanto a cobertura del seguro y 
acceso y, mediante modelos logit, se estiman los determinantes de la afiliación y del acceso, con datos de 
las encuestas de calidad de vida de 1997 y 2003. Se destaca que la cobertura pasó del 20% de la población 
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en 1993 al 60% en 2004, aunque parece imposible alcanzar la universalidad; la estructura y evolución de 
la cobertura muestran que los dos regímenes son complementarios, de modo que mientras el contributivo 
tiene mayor presencia en las ciudades y entre la población con empleo formal, el subsidiado tiene mayor 
peso entre la población rural y con bajos niveles de ingresos; por otra parte, el seguro tiene ventajas para la 
población subsidiada, con una mayor probabilidad de utilización de servicios, aunque el plan es inferior al 
del contributivo y existen barreras para el acceso. 
 
Key words: seguro de salud, acceso, afiliación, seguridad social, Colombia. 
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1.  Introduction 
 
In 1993 Colombia makes a deep reform to its social security system, switching from a public 
monopoly to a model of private participation made of three components or subsystems: pensions 
(retirement allowances), health and worker compensations. In the health component a mandatory 
insurance is stated, it is intended to globalise the coverage of this health plan, the supply 
subsidies are switched to the demand in a scheme where the money follows the consumer and a 
new institutional surrounding is created where the conformation of a market of regulated 
competition stands out.  
 
The Colombian reform was adopted by means of Law 100 of 1993 and its implementation began 
in 1995. The Law created the General System of Social Security in Health (SGSSS, for its initials 
in Spanish) and assigned two objectives to it: to regulate the essential public service of health and 
to create conditions of access of all the population to health care services at all levels of attention. 
The cornerstone of the reform consisted in the definition of an insurance upon. The principles of 
solidarity, universality and efficiency for all Colombians, therefore it established the contributive 
regime for the population with paying capacity - the workers with their families - and the 
subsidized regimen for the population with limited resources or without capacity of paying: poor 
population. The former regime is financed with a specific payroll tax of 12%; eight points are 
assumed by the employer and the remaining four by the employee. The latter regime is financed 
with public funds and with the contributions of solidarity that the population of the contributive 
regime makes (one of the twelve payroll points). Thus, the solidarity relies on the fact that 
everybody pays according to his financial capacity but everybody receives according to his health 
needs [1, 21].  
 
Before Law 100, approximately 75 to 80% of Colombians were uninsured [2] and their attention 
would be provided by public hospitals through supply subsidies (“charitable attention”); a 5% 
were covered by family equalization funds, mutuals or some other type of insurance paid by the 
employer; a minority had private insurances paid of their own or subsidized by the employer and 
an 18% were enrolled in the Institute of Social Security (ISS, for its initials in Spanish), basically 
the workers not their families. The reform to the contributive regime implied a vertical 
disintegration between the functions of purchasers (assurance) and providers, as well as the 
opening of the health insurance market, so that the ISS would be faced with the competition of 
new, private or  public, insurers created thereon [3].  
 
While a universal coverage to a same Mandatory Health Plan is obtained (POS, for its initials in 
Spanish) the Law defines a period of transition during which the uninsured (named by the Law 
100 as the “tied”) will receive attention from the government via supply subsidies in in-the-net 
public hospitals and medical centers, those in the contributive will receive a full coverage plan, 
called POS-Contributivo ("full POS") and those in the the subsidized will receive temporarily a 
limited coverage plan, called POS-Subsidiado ("limited POS"). See Table 1. 
 
The POS offers integral protection in health care to the affiliated population in its phases of 
education, information, promotion and prevention of health, diagnosis, treatment and 
rehabilitation, including the provision of essential medications in their generic name, for the 
different types of services and at all levels of complexity. Also, the POS Contributivo includes 
the granting of an economic benefit for temporary medical incapacity due to general disease, 
paternity and maternity leaves of absence. 
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With respect to the efficiency principle, a market atmosphere is created where the private sector 
is involved, theoretically in equal conditions to that of the public; the supply subsidy that 
financed public hospitals is switched to the demand subsidy that promotes the enrollment to the 
subsidized regime; a new sectorial organization is devised based on competition which includes 
redefinition of features and performers; the free negotiation between insurers and providers is 
fostered and the insurers are reimbursed with a weight capitation, according to age, gender and 
geographical location. This is to contribute to cost containment, induces the investment in health 
and rational cost attention[4]. This payment is reimbursed to the insurers as a fixed amount for 
each affiliated; up-to-date its yearly rate is US$156 for the POS-C and US$87 for the POS-S.
 
TABLE No 1 
 





Medical visits and services  Yes, extensive  Yes, extensive 
Dentistry  Yes, extensive  Yes, extensive 
Ambulatory drugs  Yes, essentials’ list  Yes, essentials’ list 
Emergencies and priority attention  Yes, extensive  Yes, extensive 
Surgical Procedures  Yes, extensive  Yes but restricted 
No Surgical Procedures  Yes, extensive  Yes but restricted 
In-hospital services  Yes, extensive  Yes but restricted 
Promotion and Prevention activities and programs  Yes, extensive Yes,  extensive 
Home Care  Yes but restricted  Yes but restricted 
Diagnosis tests   Yes, extensive  Yes but restricted 
Catastrophical diseases and transplants  Yes, extensive  Yes, extensive 
Rehabilitation and ancillary stuff  Yes, extensive  Yes but restricted 
Maternity, paternity and temporary incapacity bonus ($)  Yes, for worker  none 
Infertility, experimental and aesthetic treatments  none  none 
 
 
The stewardship of the SGSSS is responsibility of the Government, who as well presides over the 
National Council of Social Security in Health (CNSSS, for its initials in Spanish) as maximum 
entity that, among other functions, defines the coverage and the capitation value of the POS. In 
these conditions, the health insurance entities (Empresas Promotoras de Salud, EPS, for its 
initials in Spanish) are created as the ones responsible for the enrollment and the collection of the 
quotations and with the basic function to organize and guarantee directly or indirectly, the 
services and benefits of the POS. That is, the EPS are the insurers that must guarantee the access 
to the POS Contributivo, while the insurers of the subsidized regime are name Subsidy Regime 
Administrators (ARS, for its initials in Spanish). See Graph 1. 
 
The insurance per se is valid as long as it offers real protection form risk, where it is important to 
do a follow up not only of the coverage but also to access as a quality indicator of the insurance 
and visible impact of the reform[5]. By access we understand the capacity of people to look for 
and to obtain assistance in health, moreover it means a process that includes the need, the wish of 
assistance, its search, beginning and continuation[6]. Therefore, this process involves  diverse 
determinants that facilitate or hinder it, among which the insurance is an important part of the 
dowry of  people to request (demand) and to receive health services[7]. 
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Regarding to adverse selection, some penalties are settled for the no permanence in the system 
and uncovered periods (waiting time) are created for some services. The insurers are banned to 
make risk selection and people are entitled to freely choose the insurer among those in the market 
upon the premise that they all offer equal conditions of quotations (costs) and benefits (insurance 
contract).  Additionally, the insurers are required to fulfill, among other conditions to avoid 
biased selection[8] in the enrollment process, some minimum socio-demographic conditions of 
their affiliates[9]; for example, at least 5% of their members must be older than 60.  (see graph 
2).To face problems related to Moral Hazard[22], as well, the SGSSS states some alternatives 
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- Flujos existentes antes de la reformas 
- Instituciones existentes antes de la reforma 
- Flujos creados por la reforma 
- Instituciones creadas por la reforma 
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GRAPH No 2 
Regulatory environment regarding Adverse Selección and Risk Selection in the 
Colombian Health Social Security System: Contributive Regime. 
 











































Afiliación obligatoria y universal  Ley 100, Art. 156 
Selección de riesgos 
Selección adversa 
Reaseguro  Ley 100, Art. 162 y 167, parágrafo 4 
No preexistencias  Ley 100, Art. 164 
Ley 100, Art. 162  Plan obligatorio de salud (POS) 
UPC ajustada por riesgo  Acuerdo 241 / 02 
•  Edad 
•  Género 
•  Ubicación geográfica
Ley 100, Art. 156 y 182 
Periodos mínimos de cotización  Ley 100, Art. 164 
Acuerdo 245 / 03  Redistribución alto costo 
Licencias por fuera 
de la UPC 
Maternidad sin asumir riesgo
Incapacidades asumiendo riesgo en cuenta aparte 
Ley 100, Art. 207 
Ley 100, Art. 206 
Decreto 
1013 / 98 
Cobertura de 
riesgos adicionales 
Eventos catastróficos y accidentes de tránsito –ECAT– 
Seguro obligatorio de accidentes de tránsito –SOAT– 
Plan de atención básico –PAB– 
 
Ley 100, 
Art. 167 y 
165  Atención en accidentes de trabajo y enfermedad profesional –ATEP– 
Movilidad usuarios alto costo  Decreto 1485 / 94 
Participación de grupos etáreos 
  5% mayores de 60 años 




1485 / 94 
 
Decreto 
1938 / 94 
 
From: Grupo de Economía de la Salud. “Selección adversa en el régimen contributivo de salud: el caso de la EPS de 
Susalud”. Borradores del CIE, No. 10, Medellín marzo de 2004 (http://agustinianos.udea.edu.co/economia/ges).  
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TABLE No 2 
 
Issues controlling for Moral Hazard  
Consumer Provider 
Copayments Capitation 
Moderator payments  Freedom of purchasing (Market environment) 
Top in incapacity bonus  Managed Care 
Incentives for promotion and prevention  Providing profiling 
 
Colombia faced problems of inequity, inefficiency and poor health care access that motivated the 
reform [21]. The new health system shows two strategy-oriented highlights for middle and low 
income countries in order to solve the problem of access and the general health condition, in 
which the exclusion and inequity stand out. On the one hand, the Colombian system is formulated 
aimed at offering a universal enrollment in health, seeking the coverage of the whole population 
with a  rather wide set of services. On the other hand, this insurance is stated as a solution to the 
access barriers, specially of the economic type, with the participation of private agents and a 
market environment in its supply.  This way, it is interesting to know the results of the two 
highlighted aspects of the Colombian system: coverage of insurance and access.  Thus, this paper 
explores and analyzes  several issues about the coverage of the health insurance in Colombia for 
the past ten years, some evidence and data are screened regarding to access and the determinants 
of both aspects are estimated in an attempt to know the scope and the limitations that the 
Colombian system faces to meet its goal in terms on universality. These inquiries are approached 
in this paper following the format of scientific publications, so in the second section the 
objectives are presented, in the third the methodology, in the fourth the results and finally, in the 
fifth, the discussion and conclusions. 
 
2. Objectives  
 
The objectives of this paper are oriented to examine the achievements of the Colombian reform 
regarding to the coverage of the insurance and its efficacy in terms of access to health care 
assistance. Particularly, there are four objectives.  First, to analyze the evolution of the coverage 
during the first ten years of the reform in health (1995 - 2004), emphasizing the main streamlined 
facts for the contributive regime as well as the subsidized. Second, to analyze the existent barriers 
of access for people according to their type of affiliation to the system.  Third, to establish the 
determinants for enrollment (affiliation) to the contributive regime, trying to explain the 
stagnation in its coverage.  And fourth, to establish the determinants of access to health care 
services, based on General Physician visits of the ill population.  
 
3. Methods  
 
Two procedures are used to approach the raised objectives. First of all, to examine the 
streamlined facts descriptive statistics were used on coverage and service usage, and some studies 
referring to the same topics were considered as well. Secondly, to establish the determinants of 
the enrollment (affiliation) and the access some logit type models were built.  
 
The commonly used models when the dependent variables are dichotomizing are the logit 
models. These seem appropriate to meet the determinants of the affiliation and access due to the 
fact that the decision to whether enroll or not to the system and whether to use or not the medical 
J. Restrepo, A. Zambrano, M. Vélez y M. Ramírez  8Health insurance as a strategy for access. Streamlined facts of the Colombian Health Care Reform 
 






ii i x y
e




Where   represents the probability to enroll or the probability of using the medical services, 
according to the case; 
i y
i x  is the vector of explanatory variables; β  is the parameter to consider; 








y ε β + ′ = =
- 1
ln ) logit(  
 
The estimation was made through the method of Maximum probability, having used Stata 8.0.  
 
For the first model, on the determinants of the enrollment, the dependent variable is when the 
person quotes to be in the health social security system through the contributive regime, since the 
person works and is informal. The people that are considered informal are those who are blue 
collar workers, chiefs or employers of a private enterprise with less than 10 workers, day 
laborers,  housekeepers, nonprofessional independent workers, workers of their own farm and 
workers without wage. The reason to only consider the informal workers is because formal 
workers are forced to enroll by law, for there is not other determinant than the law itself, 
although, as might be seen in the presentation of the streamlined facts, this obligation is not really 
fulfilled by small entities. It is considered that a person quotes when he/she is deducted from the 
payroll, is a retiree with allowance, pays by his/her own or the employer pays. 
 
The first explanatory variable will be used in the presence of chronic disease in any family 
member, the omitted category is that there is not chronic disease in the household.  It is expected 
that when there is a chronic disease the probability of enrollment is greater since this would 
reduce the financial risk for the whole family. Education, gender, dwelling geographical location 
(zone and region), will also be used as explanatory variables. Education will be worked on in four 
categories: none, elementary, secondary and superior, the omitted category is none; it is expected 
that higher education increases the probability of enrollment.  For gender the omitted category is 
woman, for zone will be rural and for region is Atlantic. The Income Per Capita (IPC) of the 
household[11]
1 and age will be the continuous explanatory variables used in the model, it is 
expected that the greater they are the greater the probability of enrollment.  It is also expected that 
living in the urban zone and the richer regions increase the probability of enrollment. The 
inclusion of these variables is necessary for the model to identify the regional differences and 
avoid the correlation with other explanatory variables. 
 
For the second model, on the determinants of access, the dichotomizing variables will be whether 
or not to visit the doctor in the event of an illness in the past 30 days. The enrollment to the health 
social security system will be used as explanatory variable, so it is expected that enrollment 
increases the probability of access and the omitted category is people without enrollment. The 
                                                 
1   As approximation to the householder income we take the methodology  proposed by Ramírez et al. (2005). 
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health status is also used as a variable that determines access, so the worse the perceived status 
the greater the probability to visit the doctor, and the omitted category is very good health status. 
It is also expected that individuals with higher incomes and individuals who live in rural area 
show a greater probability of access. Gender and regions will also be counted as variables to  
control. The omitted categories in these dichotomizing variables are the same as for the former 
model.  
 
For the econometrics estimations the Household Surveys of Quality of Life of 1997 and 2003 
were used (ECV97 and ECV03, respectively; for its initials in Spanish). The two surveys were 
done by the National Administrative Department of Statistics (DANE, for its initials in Spanish). 
The ECV97 has 38,053 observations which represent 39.803.905 inhabitants. The ECV03 has 
81,150 observations which represent 43.717.578 inhabitants.  Each survey is representative 
enough for the regions Atlantic, Eastern, Pacific, Valle, Central, Antioquia, Bogotá, Orinoquía 
and San Andrés.  In addition, the surveys include information of the rural and the urban part for 
the regions Atlantic, Eastern, Pacific, Valle, Central and Antioquia. The methodology used in the 
two surveys, the questions of the form and the design of the sample, enable us to make 
comparisons between the two periods. 
 
4. Results 
4.1 The main streamlined facts on the coverage of the health insurance  
The covered population in the country in 1994 was of 7.5 million people, basically workers at 
formal employment,  those who work for the private sector were mainly enrolled in the ISS and 
those from the public sector were mainly enrolled in compensation and public funds. This 
population represented nearly 20% of the population of the country and they received the major 
benefits in terms of access to health services, so they absorbed a 40 to 60%[21] of the public 
funded resources allocated to health; but the rest of the population accessed to health services 
through public hospitals which where directly financed by the government, hospitals and 
professional services from the private sector and private health insurers[12]. We had then a scope 
of low coverage and high inequity regarding to access. 
 
The first effect of the 1993 reform on insurance coverage was marked by the incorporation of the 
members of the familiar group of the workers (payee), so the covered population went 
automatically, between 1994 and 1995, from 7,5 to 12,1 million people, which meant a rise from 
19,8% to 31,9% of coverage over the national population (Table 3). This population would not be 
enrolled exclusively to ISS and public funds however, because from that year on the competition 
among EPSs to promote enrollment began, so many people would choose to move to new 
insurers and ISS would lose participation. In fact, by 1997 there was an increase in the covered 
population, estimated in 12.7 million, the ISS reduced its participation to 62% of the enrolled 
population and currently it ranges at 23%.  This framework of freedom of choice and portability 
among insurers induces competition that must bring efficiency to the system.  In other words, the 
member is actively participating in the allocation of the resources within the system when picking 
out an EPS among the different alternatives.  
 
The increase in the coverage of the contributive regime was concentrated in this automatic effect, 
which is based on guaranteeing family coverage, but it was necessary to widen the number of 
paying workers to reach universality.  However, in spite of the increase in the number of 
members between 1994 and 1997, the coverage remains practically steady as percentage of the 
national population and it only showed a slight rise as percentage of the working population, the 
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positive effects been noted thus on the enrollment by the dynamics of the formal employment. 
Following, between 1997 and year 2000, the increase of the members (affiliates) was quite 
modest and the coverage was reduced to 30,9% and to 31% of the working population; it is 
noticeable that while the paying workers reduced, due to the downfall of the formal employment, 
a rise in the beneficiaries was registered, which proves the advantages of the family coverage. 
Finally, between 2000 and year 2003 a recovery of the number of members (affiliates) has taken 
place, mainly in the case of paying workers, but the coverage rates are still lower to those 
registered in 1994 and 1997 (31% of the total population and 32,2% over the workers). 
 
TABLE 3 





Payee worker 4.277.342          4.277.342          3.488.388          2.037.276                1.411.654          
Beneficiaries 2.451.514          5.988.279          4.360.486          2.648.458                1.567.812          
Total 6.728.856          10.265.621        7.848.874          4.685.734                2.979.466          
Payee worker 752.048             752.048             142.808             60.334                     49.090               
Beneficiaries 1.052.867          199.931             84.468                     87.872               
Total 752.048             1.804.915          342.739             144.802                   136.962             
Payee worker -                     -                    1.695.759          2.931.880                3.991.636          
Beneficiaries -                     -                    2.846.229          4.720.328                6.057.399          
Total -                     -                    4.541.988          7.652.208                10.049.035        
Payee worker 5.029.390          5.029.390          5.326.956          5.029.490                5.452.380          
Beneficiaries 2.451.514          7.041.146          7.406.645          7.453.254                7.713.083          
Total*** 7.480.904          12.070.536        12.733.601         12.482.744              13.165.463        
Insuring Coverage (1) 19,8% 31,9% 32,4% 29,5% 29,9%
Insuring Coverage (2) 34,3% 34,3% 35,1% 30,8% 31,5%
EPS Total beneficiaries 2.972.934          3.544.260           3.550.672                4.918.859          
CCF Total beneficiaries 1.160.460          1.543.038           2.093.782                1.977.566          
ESS Total beneficiaries         1.848.384          3.231.008                3.866.034           4.547.578 
Total  Total beneficiaries         5.981.778           8.318.306                9.510.488          11.444.003 
Insuring Coverage (3) 15,5% 21,2% 22,5% 26,0%
Insuring Coverage (4) 41,9% 57,2% 59,8% 55,9%
7.480.904           18.052.314        21.051.907         21.993.232              24.609.466         











2000 Contributive Regime 1997
Note: Coverage (1) Enrolled Population to Contributive / Population of Colombia. (2) Payee workers / number of occupied people. (3) Enrolled 
population to Subsidiazed / Population of Colombia. (4) Enrolled Population / Poor population according to NBI Index.  (*) In 1994, addapted 
entities are Family Compensation Funds and Public Health Funds, that before the reform offered protection to some public employees. (**) The 
Family Density in 1994 was 2.4. (***) Military Army, Public Teachers and Ecopetrol were not taken account. Payee worker number comes from 
the compensation database, which means those who are entitled to receive services. Information for 2003 is the one reported by the Consejo 
Nacional de Seguridad Social en Salud for 2002-2003.  Sorce: Superintendencia Nacional de Salud, Boletines de Estadística; Consejo Nacional de 
Seguridad Social en Salud. Informe del Consejo 2000-2001; 2002-2003. Encuesta de Calidad de Vidad 1997; Estadísticas ISS 1994; DANE, 
estadísticas demograficas. Adapted from GES - CIE 
 
These results show a first streamlined fact of the Colombian reform, in the sense that the group of 
the paying workers did not increase: as percentage of the working population in the country, 
which is a reference fact for enrollment to the contributive regime, the paying workers moved to 
represent from 34,3% in 1994 to 32,2% in 2003
2.  To explain this fact, the characteristics of those 
who pay or are enrolled in the contributive regime are taken into account.  Since 1997, according 
                                                 
2   Additional to the population with paying capacity that is covered by the health insurance through any EPS there 
are special regimes that cover some special type of public employees, e.g. the military staff ant teachers, who 
along with their families may represent a 4% of the coverage. 
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to data reported by the National Household Survey of Quality of Life of that year [4], it was 
noted that among the formal population the paying workers represented the 82,8% (90,7% among 
the public workers and 81,5% for enterprises with less than 10 employees), but this figure went 
down to 14,3% for the informal population (37,8% in enterprises with less than 10 workers, 
17,2% for housekeepers and maids and 12,7% for independent workers). 
 
Concerning the coverage of the subsidized regime, which would be one of the major novelties of 
the reform, granting health insurance to the population without paying capacity, a very important 
rise is noted during the first years, reaching in 1996 the 15,5% of the national population and in 
1997 the 21,2%, an stagnation during the period of economical crisis, then moving about the 22% 
between 1998 and year 2000, and a new rise from year 2000 up to levels of nearly 30% currently. 
We have then, as a second streamlined fact, that the subsidized regime has registered significant 
rises in the coverage and may soon reach more affiliated population  than the contributive 
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Colombia: Coverage of the health insurance, 1994 - 2003
  Property of the authors.  Source: Table 2 
 
The positive effects of insuring in both regimes, but mainly the advance of the subsidized regime, 
report as a third streamlined fact, that between the two social security regimes there is a 
complementation in their scopes, so, while the contributive regime has greater presence in the 
city, among the formal population and with higher level of education and income, the subsidized 
regime focuses in the rural area and covers the informal people and people with lower levels of 
education and income. In Graphs 4 and 5 this fact is illustrated for 1997 and 2003. As a result of 
this contrast, some social gaps have been reduced; for example, for year 2003 the reported 
national coverage by ECV rose to 61,8%, it is even higher in the urban area (65.5%) in 
comparison with the rural (51.7%), but it is noted that while in the former the contributive regime 
rises to 48,2% and the subsidized to 17,3%, in the latter the figures are of 13,3% and 38,4% 
respectively. 
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This fact was analyzed in the Human Development Report for Colombia of 2000 as follow:  
 
"the rural areas of the country have greatly benefited from the increase in coverage, since from a total 
enrollment participation near the 17% in the first years, they happened to cover about a 48% of the total 
population in year 1997 <…> the increase of the health insurance coverage between those two years, tended 
to favor the groups with lower incomes, for example, while the rise soared the 200% for the 20% of the 
poorest population, the corresponding rate of 20% for the richest was of 70% <…> as a result, the 
concentration in the affiliation is manifested through a reduction in the coefficient, from 0,23 to 0.040, or, in 




Enrollment to the health system by area, education and income deciles. 1997 












































Fuente: Encuesta de calidad de vida 1997. Cálculos de los autores
 


































In spite of these achievements, the coverage of the health insurance still present some equity lags 
and this is due to the economical disparity of the population which favors the enrollment of 
people with paying capacity, while the enrollment of the poor is restricted to the availability of 
fiscal resources, additional to the problems attributed to the tool used to identify and classify 
them as poor  (SISBEN). In other words, in spite of the strong reduction of the insurance gap  
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between the rich and the poor, there is still a situation of inequity: “in the first quintile only the 
48.1% is covered while in the fifth quintile the 83.7% is enrolled" [14, 15]
3. 
 
4.2 Main streamlined facts on access  
 
When questioning the advances on access, it is to note in the first place, that among the people 
within the contributive regime who manifested to have been ill in 1997, about 84% attended 
health services, while this figure went down to 70% for the people within the subsidized regime 
and to 60% for the uninsured; in year 2003, the figures show variations in both regimes, with a 
reduction of the difference (80% and 74%, respectively), while the uninsured population showed 
a backlash (50%). And in the second place, when questioning the motives for this situation, in the 
contributive regime predominate aspects about the perceived need (light case) or the lack of time 
(69% in 1997 and 63% in year 2003); in the subsidized regime the lack of money represented 
44% of the barrier of access for health assistance in 1997 and in year 2003 it went down to 30% 
marking on the contrary a rise of the perceived need, from 27% in year 1997 to 39% in 2003); 
finally, the uninsured population explains this barrier of access to the health services mainly 
because of lack of money (63% in 1997 and 57% in 2003). These results, in spite of showing that 
in the subsidized regime the lack of money remains as an important barrier of access[16], they 
show that the insured population has greater probability to receive medical attention, which 
corroborates the importance of the strategy of insuring. See Table 4. 
 
 
TABLE No 4 
Colombia: Type of Barriers of Access
4, 1997 and 2003 
 
evising the papers carried out after the reform [3, 17], they account for some critical facts. The 










People ill but not receive/use services (%) 30,9 40,1 16,0 25,8 50,3 20,2
I. Barriers from the supply
a) To the entry (geographical) 7,5 5,0 3,5 4,9 3,2 4,9
b) Inside 5,5 1,2 10,2 7,9 3,1 8,6
c) Continuity 4,0 3,0 10,2 4,0 1,9 2,9
II. Barriers from the demand
d) Disposition 12,3 7,7 19,5 15,0 7,5 17,6
e) Economical barriers (income) 43,7 63,4 9,9 29,5 56,9 10,9











People ill but not receive/use services (%) 30,9 40,1 16,0 25,8 50,3 20,2
I. Barriers from the supply
a) To the entry (geographical) 7,5 5,0 3,5 4,9 3,2 4,9
b) Inside 5,5 1,2 10,2 7,9 3,1 8,6
c) Continuity 4,0 3,0 10,2 4,0 1,9 2,9
II. Barriers from the demand
d) Disposition 12,3 7,7 19,5 15,0 7,5 17,6
e) Economical barriers (income) 43,7 63,4 9,9 29,5 56,9 10,9
f) Perceived need 26,8 19,6 45,4 38,8 27,3 55,0
Barriers of access
R
lack of money is the most frequently cited barrier for enrollment to the social security system, as 
well as to the use or the real access to health services. Although the availability of services 
increased, specially in the urban zones, which eliminated some potential  barriers of access, this 
 
3   It can also be mentioned the inequity by region, life condition and zone.  According to the National Survey of 
Demography and Health (Profamilia, 2000: 190), in Bogotá, the 72% of the population is enrolled, while in the 
Costa Atlantica region the figures only reach the 45%.  As well, the urban-rural differences remain; by age, the 
most unprotected groups are the young and  among those above 50  the uninsured status falls to an about 30%.  
4 Barriers of Access are classified according to Aday and Andersen (1974): medical center was far away; b) attention    
was dennied or to many steps before access; c) He had been attended already but still ill; d) he had not time 
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not necessarily meant a greater integral assistance, specially because of the restrictions or the 
economic impossibility to afford the cost of drugs and diagnostic tests as well as the copayments 
at major complexity assistance levels. These difficulties are probably been presented with major 
strength among the uninsured population. Since poor people have limited resources, they wish to 
obtain more services for their money[23], but sometimes insurance expenditures, for example, a 
copayment, might mean greater poverty for them. 
 
Starting from the point that insured poor people who do not use the health services have a greater 
ome papers[18] state that the Colombian reform has been exemplifying  as long as, in terms of 
inally, regarding to the effects of the reform in public health, and in spite of finding positive and 
 other words, the reform might have generated an overtrust on the demand side, so that 
.3 Determinants of enrollment (affiliation)  
he estimation of the logit model is shown in Table 5 and the marginal effects of such estimation 
ducation is an important variable at decision making about enrollment, so, the higher the   
elementary and secondary education, respectively.  
probability to drop out from the insurance, compared to those who do use the services[24], it is 
questioning if the enrollment in the subsidized, despite being costless, might be underestimated in 
those poor people to whom the copayments might mean a barrier of access.  Would it be that the 
enrollment to the subsidized is not attractive for some poor people who don not perceive the need 
of assistance but who know that in case they use the service they will have to assume a 
copayment?  This concept might even apply for some independent members of the contributive.  
Although, it s out of the scope of the proposed objectives we may question this. 
 
S
access, the major benefits have been for those ranked in the lowest income quintile.  The above 
mentioned, without affecting the achievement in the usage of the health services reached for the 
whole set of people enrolled to the system. 
 
F
negative facts, there is not a net balance on this, which in addition to considering the effects of 
the reform must also count for external factors such as the economic crisis.  Some authors have 
stated the hypothesis that an insufficient provision that might have resulted as consequence of the 
fragmentation of the benefit plans and the dilution of responsibilities among various agents, are 
unclear incentives  for the provision or the production of public health matters[19].  
 
In
somehow it slacked the impulse that from the public sector was given to these programs, added to 
the decentralization of the provision.  Others, might refer the advances obtained in the past years 
about public health traditional indicators[20] as achievements of the reform.  But what we do 
want to emphatically state is that access, good quality provided, must have a positive impact on, 





are shown in Table 6. According to the specification given to the model, the probability of 
enrollment is of 12,4% in 1997 and of 8,2% in year 2003. The estimation indicates that the 
presence of a chronic disease in any member of the family explains, partly, the decision to enroll 
to the contributive regime in 2003, increasing the probability of enrollment in about 1%. 
However, this effect, although similar, is not significant enough in 1997. This may indicate that 
people have identified, throughout the time, the benefits of insuring and thus an adverse selection 
problem reveals since the ill people are been insured but not all of the healthy ones.  
 
E
education the person has the greater the probability of enrollment. This effect is similar in both 
years.  As indicated in Table 5, an individual with superior education increases the probability of 
enrollment in about 26%. These probability increases are of 6% and 13% for individuals with 
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TABLE No 5  
Estimations of Determin ation)  ants of Enrollment (Affili
1997 2003 
   Coef. t Coef. t 
Chronic Disease             
Yes 0.07714  1.03  0.120842  1.86* 
Education             
Elementary  3   4.84***  0.51218  .31*** 0.814096 
Secundary  1.098934 6.46*** 1.466449 8.39*** 
Superior  1.664967 8.49*** 1.760385 7.44*** 
Gender             
Male  0.283573 3.69*** 0.281669 4.29*** 
Log per capita income  0.537577  11.43***  0.896733  20.3*** 
Age  0.023341  9.74***  0.027003  12.66*** 
Zone             
Urban  0.631013 6.93*** 0.490832 5.67*** 
Region             
Orinoquía  0.222555 1.31 0.014837 0.08 
Bogotá  0.318261 2.21** 0.597238  5.81*** 
Central  0.307644 2   3.51***  .24** 0.440125 
Pacífico 0.323518  1.85*  -0.33681  -2.54** 
Oriental  0.332798 2.52** 0.437262  3.51*** 
Valle  0.602484 4.2*** 0.375251  2.84*** 
Antioquia  0.679465 5.1*** 0.761875  5.63*** 
San Andrés  1.170301  6.59***  0.537653  3.2*** 
Constant  -10.528  -17.61***  -15.6692  -27.53*** 
F-statistic 55.6** 1*** *  92.  
Observations  37 33 11 1  23 5 
Size of population  11231600  12985083 
                        S : ´***´ 0.01, ´**´ 0.05, ´*´  o signif.  
 
t in 3% in 1997 and 2% in the year 
03; this effect is significant for both years. Being a year older increases the probability in 0.3% 
 although they decrease in time since living in the 
rban area would increase the probability of enrollment in 6.4% in 1997 and in 3.5% in year 
 
TABL
ignif. codes:  0.1, ´´ N
The fact of being male increases the probability of enrollmen
20
in 1997 and in 0.2% in year 2003, while a little raise in the income would increase this 
probability in 6% in 1997 and 7% in 2003.  
 
The differences between zones are evident
u
2003. Regarding to the regional differences it is seen that in 1997 living in the regions of Bogotá, 
Central, Pacifico and Oriental increases the probability of affiliating in about 4%, with respect to 
the regions Atlantica and Orinoquía.  This increase of the probability is of 8% in Valle, 9% in 
Antioquia and 19% in San Andrés. For year 2003, the increase is similar in the Central and 
Oriental regions, in Bogotá is of 5,4%, while in the other regions it decreases: in Valle to 3%, in 
Antioquia to 7% and in San Andrés to 5%.  Living in the Pacifico region decreases the 
probability of affiliating in 2.3%. 
 
 
E No 6 
J. Restrepo, A. Zambrano, M. Vélez y M. Ramírez  16Health insurance as a strategy for access. Streamlined facts of the Colombian Health Care Reform 
 
 Marginal Effects of the D  Enrollment (Affiliation)  eterminants of
   1997  2003 
Probability 0.124  0.082 
   Dy/dx z  dy/dx z     
Chronic Disease             
Yes 0.008  1.02  1.83*  0.009 
Education             
Primary  0.057 3   4   .24*** 0.064  .58***
Secundary  0.134 5.78*** 0.123 7.48*** 
Superior  0.286 6.44*** 0.251 4.97*** 
Gender             
Male  0.030 3.78*** 0.021 4.38*** 
Log per capita income  0.058  11.57***  0.067  19.58*** 
Age  0.003  9.78***  0.002  12.96*** 
Zone             
Urbano  0.064 7.16*** 0.035 5.93*** 
Region             
Orinoquía  0.026 1.22 0.001 0.08 
Bogotá 0. 8  03 2.04**  5.07***  0.054 
Central 0.036  2   .09** 0.038  3.14*** 
Pacífico 0.039  1.69*  -0.023  -2.79*** 
Oriental 0.039  2.36**  0.037  3.18*** 
Valle 0.079  3   .62*** 0.032  2.55** 
Antioquia 0.089  4.4***  0.073  4.58*** 
San  Andrés  0.189 5.06*** 0.050 2.65*** 
Signif. codes: : ´***´ 0.01 05, ´  No s   
 
.4 Determinants of access 
able 7 shows the logit estimation of the determinants of access and Table 8 shows the marginal 
s to 
 2003, but not in 
significant in year 
TABL  No 7 




effects of such estimation. According to the specification given to the model, the probability to 
use the medical services when a person is ill is of 79,5% in 1997 and 69,5% in year 2003.  
 
he enrollment to the health social security system has quite important effects on the acces T
medical services. Being affiliated to the contributive regime means that the probability to use the 
medical services is of 95% in both years; while being part of the subsidized regime implies that 
this probability is of 85% in 1997 and of 90% in year 2003. Even though, there are differences 
between both regimes, these differences have been disappearing with the time.   
 
he health status influences when deciding to use the medical services in year T
1997. Thus, the better the health status the less the probability to visit the doctor. When the 
individual perceives a bad health status the probability to attend to a doctor increases in 10.6%, 
this increase is of 8,5% if the perceived health status is regular.  
 
ender is important in the decision to attend a doctor in 1997, but it is not  G
2003. Therefore, being male decreases the probability of access in 4.5%. Having a higher income 
leads to increase the probability of access; for both years, a raise of the income leads to an 





J. Restrepo, A. Zambrano, M. Vélez y M. Ramírez  17Health insurance as a strategy for access. Streamlined facts of the Colombian Health Care Reform 
 




   Coef. t Coef. t 
Regime             
Contributive    .97 **  3.7 **  0.922148 9 * 1.237173  1 9*
Subsidiazed 0.355025  4.34***  1.125307  12.07*** 
Health Status             
Poor  0.27569 1.6 0.55617  2.66*** 
Regular 0.10862  0.72  0.407822  2.23** 
Good  0.110989 0.72 0.209998 1.16 
Gender             
Male  -0.27031 -3.96*** -0.10667  -1.48 
log per capita income  0.30923  6****  0.234374  4.36*** 
Zone             
Urban 0   5.54***  .43 63 28 0.028186  0.34 
Region             
Orinoquía -0.1 93  25 -0.75  -0.29558  -1.3 
Bogotá -0.3667  -   2.27** -0.09158  -0.84 
Central 0.119138  0.97  -0.31319  -2.46** 
Pacífico 0.384496  2.61***  -0.03115  -0.28 
Oriental  -0.56271 -5.1**** -0.09255  -0.71 
Valle -0.1586  -1.1  0.090657  0.66 
Antioquia  0.088607 0.75 0.208824 1.4 
San Andrés  2.75***  2.87***  0.926861  1.429781 
Constant  -2.78449  -4.21***  -3.07001  -4.47*** 
F-statistic 26.32* 1* **  24.5 ** 
Observations 7558  8655 
Size of population  5019240.7  8020072 
Signif. codes: : ´***´ 0.01, ´**´ ´ No signif. 
 
n the estimation it is seen that the differences between the urban and rural zone are not longer 
TABL  No  8 
 Marginal Effect inants of Access 
  
 0.05, ´*´ 0.1, ´   
I
significant in 2003, although they were in 1997.  In 1997, being part of the urban area meant that 
the person would have a greater probability to access to medical services than in the rural area of 
7.5%. The regional differences have also decrease. While in 1997 living in Bogotá or in the 
Oriental region meant decreases of the probability to access a doctor in 6.5% and 10%, 
respectively; the Pacifico region presented increases of 6% and San Andrés of 11%, compared 
with the other regions. For year 2003, only the Central and San Andrés regions present 
differences with other regions; in the former the decrease of probability is of 7% and in the latter 
an increase of 21%. 
 
E
s of the Determ
1997  2003 
Probability 0.795  0.695 
    dy/dx z dy/dx   z 
Regime             
Contributive  0.146 10.74*** 0.250 14.72*** 
Subsidiazed 0.054  4.67***  0.205  14.37*** 
Health Status             
Poor 0. 2  04 1. *  72 0.106  2.99*** 
Regular 0.018  0.72  0.085  2.26** 
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Good  0.018 0.72 0.044 1.16 
Gender             
Male -0.045  -3 *  .92** -0.023  -1.47 
log per capita income  0.050  6.19***  0.050  4.38*** 
Zone             
Urban 0.075  5.27***  0.006  0.34 
Region             
Orinoquía  -0.021 -0.73 -0.066 -1.25 
Bogotá -0 5  -2.12**  -0.020  -0.84  .06
Central 0.019  0.99  -0.069  -2.4** 
Pacífico 0.057  2.88***  -0.007  -0.27 
Oriental -0.101  -4 *  .79** -0.020  -0.7 
Valle -0.027  -1.07  0.019  0.67 
Antioquia  0.014 0.76 0.043 1.44 
San  Andrés  3   4   0.113  .85*** 0.210  .77***
Signif. codes: : ´***´ 0.0  0.05, ´ , ´´ No signif.  
 
 
. Discussion and conclusions  
oved from 20% to 60% of the population; although the 
roposed objective, and the reason of being, have not being reached, that is universality, this 
t to the subsidized, a sustained and increasing tendency in the enrollment is seen.  
his makes us believe that soon the number of persons enrolled to this regime, contrary to the 
 regimes, contributive and subsidized, a complementarity 
 taking place in their scope,  having citizens with different profiles in terms of geographic 
robability to 
ceive medical assistance, which corroborates the importance of the strategy of universal 
l, the enrollment probability is lower in 2003 
an in year 1997. 
 
1, ´**´ *´ 0.1    
5
 
In 10 years the insurance coverage m
p
dramatic increase is a great advance.  It brings to the attention that in the contributive regime the 
enrollment of paying workers, understood as percentage of the working population, has not 
increase.  This contrasts with the sudden increase of people enrolled at the beginning of the 
reform, basically explained by the family coverage.  The economic crisis at the end of the 90s 
with the consequent rise of informality in employment could have contributed to such 





premises with which the reform was made, will soar those of the contributive.  This fact is good 
because it decreases the inequity when insuring more poor people but sets a challenge to the 
financial sustainability of the system.   
 
There is evidence that between the two
is
location (zone), education, level of income and occupation enrolled to each one.       
 
It is evident that in the Colombian experience the insured population has a greater p
re
insuring which might lead to reduce the inequity in the access.  It is important to stand out that 
for the uninsured the main barrier of access is the lack of money while for those enrolled to the 
SGSSS, whether contributive or subsidized, the main reason to not visit the doctor is that they do 
not perceive the need to do so.  It would be interesting to know if this greater access has a 
positive impact in the public health of the country. 
 
According to the specifications given to the mode
th
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In spite of the measures stated on the reform to avoid adverse selection, when any member of the 
family has a chronic disease, there is a greater probability of enrollment.  Again, the importance 
f the universal coverage is corroborated, that added to its meaning in terms of equity will help 
 greater in the urban zone than in the 
ral, for year 2003 this gap has been closing.  There are also regional differences, which are not 
cial security.  There is a greater probability of 
ccess to the services in the contributive (95%) but for 2003 the difference with the subsidized 
e subsidized regime than for the contributive, and second, the insured has 
reater access to health services than the uninsured.  In other words, inequity decreases for being 
ght recovery, 
om 2000 to year 2003. 
enefits and the same costs, it is hoped that the competition be basically 
r quality in the provision of the services.  That is the importance to give qualified, prompt and 
 of insurance and the Colombian health system are a good example and 
n option to be considered by those countries with inequity concerns and poor access to health 
aphy 
  Londoño, Juan Luis y Frenk, Julio (1997). “Pluralismo estructurado: hacia un modelo innovador en la reforma de los sistemas 
de salud en América Latina”. Banco Interamericano de Desarrollo, Oficina del Economista Jefe, Documento de Trabajo 353.   
o
minimize the possibility of any kind of biased selection.      
 
The positive determinants of the enrollment are: greater education, male gender, greater age and 
higher income.  It is true that the probability of enrollment is
ru
convenient, specially if we consider that living in the Pacifico, which is a low income region, 
decreases the probability of enrollment in 2,3%. 
 
Regarding to access, it is very clear that the main determinant to use the health services (medical 
visit) is whether or not being enrolled in the so
a
(90%) has been disappearing.  On the contrary, not being enrolled (uninsured)  means a low 
probability of access to health services.  Equally, the probability to use more the services 
increases in those people who perceive a bad health status in those who have greater incomes and 
in the female gender.  The differences observed in 1997 between the rural and the urban zone no 
longer exist for 2003, this might mean a major penetration of insurance in the rural zone.   
Regarding to region, the differences observed in 1997 are decreasing and for 2003 only 2 out of 
the 8 regions present differences: San Andrés increases and Central decreases the probability to 
access to the services. 
 
We might said that the Colombian reform has had equity since, first, the growth in the enrollment 
has been greater for th
g
enrolled means greater access and that the insurance has mainly reached the poorer. 
 
Broadly speaking, the reform has had three periods, the initial, from 1994 to 1997, the one of 
consolidation plus crisis, from 1997 to 2000, and the one of consolidation plus sli
fr
 
Finally, it is important to stand out that in front of a market where all the health insurers offer the 
same contract, the same b
fo
unbiased information not only to the consumer (affiliate) but also to the whole market.  A fact 
clearly stated in the reform but still pending in the Colombian case.  An important issue is that in 
less than 10 years the new insurers already have more than 75% of the market share and the ISS 
shows a decreasing trend in its numbers.  This mobility is the result of portability of the insurance 
and of enabling the citizen to freely choose he who will provide him with the POS among any 
insurers in the market.   
 
In spite of the fact that Colombia does not fully reach the objectives stated in its reform, we 
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Reasons for not consulting, by quintile. 1997 y 2003. 
  Quintiles 1997    Quintiles 2003   
    1 2 3 4 5  Total  1 2  3  4  5  Total 
79,474 124,997 109,021  89,298 126,632 529,422 81,025 89,205 137,766  123,219  141,152 572,367 Mild case 
17.8 30.6 31.6 34.4 54.1 31.3  23.3 29.9  40.2  38.8  59.9  37.1 
19,453 18,515 32,037 33,117 26,672 129,794 8,335 13,404 17,710  22,945  16,251 78,646 Didn’t have 
time  4.4 4.5 9.3 12.7  11.4  7.7  2.4 4.5  5.2  7.2  6.9  5.1 
33,990 12,038 9,300  9,854 6,536 71,718 15,875 7,950 12,028  17,331  9,350 62,534 Distant 
center  7.6 2.9 2.7 3.8 2.8 4.2  4.6 2.7  3.5  5.5  4.0  4.1 
258,496 197,206 144,758  60,214 31,117 691,791 199,370 150,951 126,644  97,743  31,396 606,103 Lack of 
money  57.9 48.3 42.0 23.2 13.3 40.9  57.3 50.6  37.0  30.8  13.3  39.3 
5,175 2,395 5,058  11,193 0 23,821 7,000 12,359 12,636  14,120  10,644 56,759 Bad service 
1.2 0.6 1.5 4.3 0.0 1.4  2.0 4.1  3.7  4.4  4.5  3.7 
2,605 6,792 3,612 1,301 2,755 17,065 11,192 3,771 1,292  5,059  7,158 28,472 Wasn’t 
atended  0.6 1.7 1.0 0.5 1.2 1.0  3.2 1.3  0.4  1.6  3.0  1.8 
21,722 24,242 18,003 19,936 7,318 91,221 10,102 7,148 10,035  10,667  6,416 44,369 Don’t trust 
in doctors  4.9 5.9 5.2 7.7 3.1 5.4  2.9 2.4  2.9  3.4  2.7  2.9 
18,838 11,267 12,505 17,847 17,484 77,941 4,672 7,176 9,736  12,821  3,785 38,190 Haven’t 
solved  4.2 2.8 3.6 6.9 7.5 4.6  1.3 2.4  2.8  4.0  1.6  2.5 
6,656 11,226 10,197 17,027 15,608 60,714 10,334 6,235 14,688  13,452  9,565 54,274 Too much 
proceeding
s  1.5 2.7 3.0 6.6 6.7 3.6  3.0 2.1  4.3  4.2  4.1  3.5 
446,409 408,678 344,491 259,787 234,122 1,693,487 347,905 298,198 342,536  317,357  235,718 1,541,713 Total 
100 100 100 100 100 100  100 100  100  100  100  100 
Source: ECV 1997-2003. 









Reasons for not consulting, by type of affiliation. 1997 y 2003. 
 1997  2003 
   Contributive SubsidizedNon insured Total   Contributive Subsidized Non insured  Total  
191,813 132,951 204,658 529,422 236,712 104,752  230,903 572,367 Mild case 
51.6 28.8  23.8 31.3  55.6 38.8  27.3 37.1 
49,659 31,774 48,361 129,794 37,410 17,664  23,573 78,646 Didn’t have time 
13.4 6.9 5.6  7.7  8.8  6.5 2.8  5.1 
11,021 35,025 25,672 71,718 22,033 13,176  27,325 62,534 Distant center 
3.0 7.6  3.0 4.2  5.2 4.9  3.2 4.1 
20,420 190,914 480,457 691,791 45,214 79,594  481,295 606,103 Lack of money 
5.5 41.4  55.8  40.9  10.6  29.5  56.9  39.3 
8,253 4,699 10,869 23,821 29,291 15,574 11,894  56,759 Bad service 
2.2 1.0  1.3 1.4  6.9 5.8  1.4 3.7 
6,946 6,931 3,188 17,065 11,162 7,857  9,453  28,472 Wasn’t atended 
1.9 1.5  0.4 1.0  2.6 2.9  1.1 1.8 
17,305 22,794 51,122 91,221 8,343 7,352  28,674 44,369 Don’t trust in 
doctors 
4.7 4.9  5.9 5.4  2.0 2.7  3.4 2.9 
28,722 22,067 27,152 77,941 11,540 10,662  15,988 38,190 Haven’t solved 
7.7 4.8  3.2 4.6  2.7 3.9  1.9 2.5 
37,422 14,312 8,980 60,714 24,108 13,448  16,718 54,274 Too much 
proceedings 
10.1 3.1 1.0  3.6  5.7  5.0 2.0  3.5 
371,561 461,467 860,4591,693,487 425,812 270,078  845,823  1,541,713 Total 
100 100  100 100  10   0 100  100 100 
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Taken Actions to Solve Health Need, According with Type of Affiliation, 1997 and 2003. 
 1997  2003 
 Contributive  Subsidized  Non  insured Total Contributive Subsidized  Non  insured Total 
3,125,153 1,142,736 1,912,921 6,180,810  1,722,728 807,225  877,976 3,407,929  Professional or 
health institution  87.1 70.4 68.2 77.1 79.5 74.4 49.7 67.9 
90,065 18,770 29,847  138,682  19,029 8,364 42,205  69,598  Health promoter or 
nurse 
2.5 1.2 1.1 1.7 0.9 0.8 2.4 1.4 
33,388 43,547  133,691  210,626  60,879 29,879  123,170  213,927 
Pharmaceutic 
0.9 2.7 4.8 2.6 2.8 2.8 7.0 4.3 
11,985 33,726 79,115 124826 5,470 7,624  35,504  48,599 
Alternative therapies 
0.3 2.0 2.9 1.5 0.3 0.7 2.0 0.9 
82,299 122,332  191,537  396,168  137,632 85,555 253,152  476,339 
Household remedy 
2.3 7.5 6.8 4.9 6.3 7.9  14.3  9.5 
123,070 161,754 313,867 598,691 154,650 102,802 346,260 603,712 
Self-prescription 
3.4 10.0  11.2 7.5  7.1 9.5  19.6  12.0 
120,819 100,108 142,249 363,176  67,181 44,219 87,737  199,136 
Nothing 
3.4 6.2 5.1 4.5 3.1 4.1 5.0 4.0 
3,586,779 1,622,973 2,803,227 8,012,979 2,167,570 1,085,667 1,766,004 5,019,241 
Total 
100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Source: ECV 1997-2003 
 
 
Chronic Disease According to Type of Affiliation. 1997 y 2003 









consult  No Total 
11.1 2.8  86.1  100.0  12.3 4.9  82.8  100.0 
Contributive  1,676,737 423,289 12,995,52315,095,549 2,097,538 827,017 14,086,293 17,010,848
7.8 4.8  87.5  100.0  8.1 6.4  85.5  100.0 
Subsidized  598,408 365,299 6,724,962 7,688,669 808,813 640,640  8,571,413 10,020,866
5.5 3.9  90.6  100.0  3.6 6.8  89.6  100.0 
Non insured  943,033 669,233 15,445,94017,058,206 593,762 1,136,556  14,955,546 16,685,864
8.1 3.7  88.3  100.0  8.0 6.0  86.0  100.0  Total 
3,218,178 1,457,821 35,166,42539,842,424 3,500,113 2,604,213  37,613,253 43,717,578
Source: ECV 1997-2003. 
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Hospitalization According to Type of Affiliation, 1997 y 2003. 
Source: ECV 1997-2003. 
 


































   1997  2003 
  Si No  Si No 
78.2 21.8 79.3 20.7 
Contributive  1,988,217 553,997 1,547,335 404,243 
72.4 27.6 78.3 21.7 
Subsidized  936,603 357,497 735,363 203,518 
75.9 24.1 66.7 33.3 
Non insured  1,740,664 552,370 900,085 449,437 
76.1 23.9 75.1 24.9 
Total  4,665,484 1 3 1 ,463,864 ,182,783 ,057,198 
Sou V 1997-20
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